The kalām cosmological argument (KCA) posits an elegant deductive argument: if its two premises can be substantiated over their alternatives, then the conclusion necessarily follows. The syllogism is as follows:
- Major premise: Whatever begins to exist has a cause.
- Minor premise: The universe began to exist.
- Conclusion: Therefore, the universe has a cause.
As with the case for the KCA, it is best to scrutinize each premise and the conclusion individually.
Whatever Begins to Exist Has a Cause
The Scottish philosopher David Hume made his reputation by exposing the hidden assumption behind the Major Premise. We say “whatever begins to exist has a cause” only because every beginning we have ever witnessed is a re-arrangement of matter inside an already-running universe: one billiard ball rolls, another moves; flint strikes steel, flame appears; seed meets soil, tree grows. Thousands of such cases let us spot a pattern. This is called inductive reasoning: It’s always happened before, so it will keep happening. Hume has no quarrel with induction inside the universe as long as one admits all knowledge is inductive (i.e. we know the sun rises every morning, and even though we can be very sure it will rise tomorrow morning, we can never be absolutely certain). His real red flag goes up the moment we export that inductive pattern to the universe itself: “there can be no demonstrative arguments to prove, that those instances, of which we have had no experience, resemble those, of which we have had experience.”1 Accordingly, the Major Premise collapses the moment we notice that nothing we’ve ever observed actually begins to exist: every person, planet, or pizza is just matter doing a costume change between acts. The first law of thermodynamics guarantees that energy cannot be created or destroyed; it only rearranges. With zero real examples of true beginning-to-exist, the claim “whatever begins to exist has a cause” is an empty slogan because the induction has zero data. American philosopher Wes Morriston drives the point home: “We have no experience of the origin of worlds to tell us that worlds don’t come into existence like that. We don’t even have experience of the coming into being of anything remotely analogous to the ‘initial singularity’ that figures in the Big Bang theory of the origin of the universe.”2 Paul Draper, another American philosopher, sharpens the blade still further: “Experience only supports the claim that anything that begins to exist within time has a cause of its existence. For we have no experience whatsoever of things beginning to exist with time. Such things would require timeless causes, and we have no experience of this.”3 Applying causation to the origin of the universe is a category mistake: causation presupposes temporal relations and physical laws inside the universe. Pro-KCA advocates must therefore prove that the universe had an absolute beginning. The problem remains, however: even if one could substantiate that something “begins to exist”—viz, the universe—that would give us exactly one data point of something coming into existence, and there is still no way to prove that that beginning had, or needed, a cause. In short, the premise under scrutiny could be true, but it could equally be false. Flip a coin.
Of the two premises, the second is far more contested—and therefore stronger ground on which to refute the KCA—for even if we can trace the onset of our universe, the premise must prove an absolute beginning from nothing, yet plenty of theories suggest otherwise.
The Universe Began to Exist
The Major Premise of the KCA is argued on two fronts: a philosophical rationale and a scientific rationale, both working to substantiate the finitude of our universe as the absolute origin of space, time, matter, and energy. To begin, we shall critique the philosophical.
Critiquing Philosophical Arguments for “The Universe Began to Exist”
The philosophical case made by the KCA for an absolute beginning from an uncaused cause hinges on a chain of logical arguments asserting that the universe cannot regress temporally into infinity. We do not have a time machine to check if the universe goes back forever. Empirically speaking, time invariably marches on, so even if one rewinds the clock, there is no logical contradiction that it will too proceed ad infinitum. Accordingly, the default position is that the universe could keep going back, like everything we experience. It is therefore incumbent on the KCA to give strong positive reasons why this logical—not scientific—default is wrong. In its attempt, it falls short.
One of the KCA’s pillar arguments is that an infinite temporal past would prohibit its completion in the present. For example, if it takes an infinite amount of years to become a doctor, it would be a logical contradiction if there existed any doctors, for if there were a doctor, they would have to have completed an infinite amount of school years, but by its definition, an infinity can’t be completed. This argument sounds convincing at first, but if it could be proven that infinities are traversed, then wouldn’t that dispel this argument? Look no further than where you stand. We cross infinities all the time in motion. Imagine you stand at point A and point B is 10 feet ahead. Between A and B, there are infinitely many points: A, then halfway, then halfway of that, and so on forever. However, eventually the accumulating halfway marks collapse as you arrive at point B. Philosopher Stephen Puryear correlates this to time’s culmination in the present: “We traverse actual infinites all the time. . . . Consider the fact that things move from one point in space to another. In so doing, the moving object passes through an actual infinity of intervening points. Hence, motion involves traversing an actual infinite; and . . . we cannot reasonably deny that motion takes place.”4 The present isn’t the completion of an eternity of time; rather, it’s just one point along the infinite timeline of reality.
Another pillar of the KCA is its claim that actual infinites—completed totalities, as opposed to potential infinites—cannot exist in reality. For example, time has the potential to progress infinitely, just as one could count 0, 1, 2, 3, … and never stop, but one could not have completed counting an actual, completed infinite. To argue that actual infinites don’t correspond to reality but only abide in conception, philosophers have formulated thought experiments to demonstrate this. One common argument is Hilbert’s Hotel, named after mathematician David Hilbert, who used it to illustrate the peculiarity of infinities. Picture a hotel with infinitely many rooms, all full. A new guest arrives, so the desk clerk moves everyone: room 1 to 2, 2 to 3, and so on. Room 1 frees up. Are there still infinitely full rooms? Now, say all of the odd rooms are vacated; but even after dividing the rooms in half, would there still be infinitely many rooms occupied? KCA advocates argue this is obviously absurd, for actual infinites break reality.
Wes Morriston explains that this seeming absurdity is actually exactly how infinity behaves in mathematics. That is, the details of Hilbert’s Hotel are not a contradiction; they’re a feature. For example, if you remove all the even-numbered rooms from an infinite hotel, you’re still left with infinitely many rooms (the odds), even though you took away “half.” That seems impossible with finite things—like if you have 10 apples and remove 5, you don’t have 10 left—but with infinity, ∞ − ∞ can still equal ∞. It’s odd, but cogent. Philosopher Graham Oppy adds a simple example: take all the counting numbers (1, 2, 3, 4…) and pair each one with an even number (1→2, 2→4, 3→6…). You can match every number to an even number perfectly, one-to-one, with none left over, even though the even numbers are only “half” of the full list. This shows infinite sets don’t follow finite rules, but that doesn’t mean they’re impossible; it means they’re different.5 The real problem, says Morriston, is that Hilbert’s Hotel depends on movable, changeable objects.6 You can shift guests, reassign rooms, relabel numbers like stickers on doors, but past events are not like that. You cannot move the year 1800 to make room for 1801. You cannot remove all events after 2000 BC and leave the rest. You cannot shuffle history like hotel guests. Because the past is fixed, the kind of operations that make Hilbert’s Hotel seem absurd cannot be performed on time. Thus, Hilbert’s Hotel, and others like it, say nothing about whether an infinite past is possible.
A final argument that intimates science yet returns to philosophy questions the very metaphysical foundations of time itself. For what time is is not so obvious anymore. Until the 20th century, time was considered to be defined as all events being formed sequentially, where the only real thing is the present. The past is no longer real and the future is not yet real. However, this seems to break down when general relativity is factored in. According to Albert Einstein’s general relativity, time is relative to the observer. The easiest way to understand this is that the faster someone moves through space, the more time will exponentially slow down for them. So the present for one individual can vary from another. “[T]he distinction between past, present, and future is only a stubbornly persistent illusion,”7 Einstein notes. Some philosophers extrapolate this notion to elucidate an infinite regress, where perhaps we are beginning with the wrong premise that only the present is real (presentism) whereas instead, all points in time are equally real; therefore, no infinite succession culminating in the present is necessary.
The foregoing arguments pertain to the workings of metaphysics. We now set aside the meta.
Scientific Arguments for “The Universe Began to Exist”
The KCA’s second premise subscribes to the picture of the universe gradually condensing down to a single, absolute origin—the Big Bang—an almost ice-cream-cone shape. And if we reverse the clock and observe the universe condense back to its original origin point, the density of matter and the curvature of spacetime increase without bound, resulting in what is known as a singularity. Proponents of the KCA argue that the singularity is equivalent to an absolute beginning of the universe because even though space-time and matter theoretically endlessly condense, this infinite getting closer and closer really collapses into nothingness. The problem with this is that as physicists’ understanding of quantum mechanics and general-relativity increased in the mid-20th century along with their implications on cosmological models, physicists realized that the equations of general relativity break down at a certain scale: Planck length (10⁻³⁵ m) and Planck time (10⁻⁴³ s). In simple terms, the laws of physics as we know them break down and no longer apply once the universe reaches a small enough size. Some have argued that the BGV theorem cannot apply once you reach this quantum scale, for it only applies to Einstein’s special relativity. American theoretical physicist Sean Carroll sets the record straight: “The second premise of the Kalam argument is that the universe began to exist. Which may even be true! But we certainly don’t know, or even have strong reasons to think one way or the other. Craig thinks we do have a strong reason, the Borde-Guth-Vilenkin theorem. So I explained what every physicist who has thought about the issue understands: that the real world is governed by quantum mechanics, and the BGV theorem assumes a classical spacetime, so it says nothing definitive about what actually happens in the universe; it is only a guideline to when our classical description breaks down.”8 Cosmologists therefore turned to quantum mechanics not out of philosophical preference but out of mathematical necessity: classical physics simply cannot describe conditions where spacetime curvature becomes infinite and precise predictability vanishes.
Renowned theoretical physicist Stephen Hawking, in collaboration with physicist James Hartle, proposed their Hartle-Hawking model in 1983, a theory that reimagined the origin of the universe in light of this breakdown of general relativity at the quantum level.9 The major proposal of the Hartle-Hawking model is that at the quantum level of the singularity, time collapses into space. At that scale, there is no distinct past, present, or future, only a smooth, curved geometry that at one arbitrary point transitioned into the familiar time-ordered universe we inhabit. In this picture, the universe is finite but unbounded, much like the surface of the Earth. Asking what came before the Big Bang is as meaningless as asking “what’s north of the North Pole?” Time itself, according to the Hartle-Hawking model, emerges from a timeless quantum state. This idea is often illustrated, instead of an ice-cream cone, as resembling the rounded end of a shuttlecock. Here, the universe tapers off in the past, not into a point, but into a finite, curved surface where time and space merge. The Hartle-Hawking model does not deny the Big Bang’s expansion but reinterprets genesis, evading the necessity of an absolute beginning.The model, however, is not without difficulties, as it implements imaginary numbers into the equations to make it work. The point of referencing it is that it’s a perfect example that reveals that quantum cosmology can produce mathematically coherent descriptions of a universe without a first moment. Just because there is no proof or absolutely working theorem of an eternal state prior to the Big Bang, it’s an example of a theory that exemplifies the creative and innovative potential that may very well come to fruition in the future.
This glimpse into quantum cosmology, along with the philosophical compatibility of an infinite regress of time, has opened the door to explicitly eternal cosmologies that don’t make the case of how time might be different, but that work to create models for the mechanics of what was going on before the Big Bang and how they generated our universe. For example, one of the leading working theories of this is eternal inflation. Eternal inflation says the uniquely rapid expansion right after the Big Bang never fully stops. Instead, random quantum fluctuations create new expanding bubbles universe for eternity, making our universe just one pocket in an endless, beginningless cosmic expansion.10
To conclude this premise critique, consider the public fascination with unidentified flying object (UFO) sightings. Whenever a mysterious craft is captured on video, two explanations vie for attention. Some immediately attribute it to extraterrestrial visitors from deep space that have never been remotely proven. Yet, even when details like propulsion or origin or the UFO remain unclear, the default alternative assumption remains far more grounded: that the UFO is simply a man-made flying object. Governments worldwide develop advanced, secret technology; unexplained does not mean unexplainable within known physical reality. The same principle applies to the universe’s origin—or lack thereof. The Kalam cosmological argument demands that everything which begins to exist must have a cause, then leaps to a supernatural creator without justification. This mirrors the error of invoking aliens over proven engineering. In both cases, the simpler, more rational explanation extends known natural laws rather than positing unproven entities beyond observation. The KCA insists that everything which begins to exist must have a cause, yet it leaps to a supernatural creator without evidence, just as jumping to aliens ignores proven human engineering. In both cases, the more parsimonious explanation roots the phenomenon in extensions of known physical laws rather than invoking unproven entities outside our observable framework. Quantum models already provide naturalistic mechanisms for a universe without a discrete beginning, rendering an absolute beginning obsolete.
Therefore, the Universe Has a Cause.
As this critique of the first premise made clear, there is no reliable evidence that whatever begins to exist has a cause, for not only is this not falsifiable, but moreover, nothing has ever begun to exist from nothing, so who’s to say it would need a cause? Now if the argument were to say something along the lines of the first principle that all effects have causes, it would be easy to agree that yes, whatever event transpires has a cause, and yes, therefore the universe has a cause. It is, however, a non sequitur to then equate a cause with the transcendent. Of course the universe had a cause, and maybe even its cause is itself uncaused, but nowhere does a cause—even if it is uncaused itself—warrant making the canyon of a jump from the natural to the supernatural. So if there is any part of the KCA’s syllogism that got it right, it would be its conclusion. Yes, the universe has a cause; no one really doubts that. But if physical and metaphysical mechanisms can be in place to do that causing, then there is no reason to suggest otherwise. Albeit theological convictions might induce.
- Hume, D. (1739). A treatise of human nature (Project Gutenberg ed.). https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/4705 ↩︎
- Morriston, W (2000). “Must the Beginning of the Universe Have a Personal Cause? A Critical Examination of the Kalam Cosmological Argument”. Faith and Philosophy. 17: 149. doi:10.5840/faithphil200017215. ↩︎
- Draper, P. (1993). A critique of the kalām cosmological argument. In Q. Smith & W. L. Craig, Theism, atheism, and big bang cosmology (pp. 155–173). Clarendon Press.
↩︎ - Puryear, S. (2017). Finitism and the Beginning of the Universe. In P. Copan & W. L. Craig (Eds.), The kalām cosmological argument: Philosophical arguments for the finitude of the past (Vol. 1, p. 208). Bloomsbury Academic.
↩︎ - Oppy, G. (2017). Grapham Oppy on the Kalām Cosmological Argument. In P. Copan & W. L. Craig (Eds.), The kalām cosmological argument: Philosophical arguments for the finitude of the past (Vol. 1). Bloomsbury Academic.
↩︎ - Morriston, Wes. (2017). Must Metaphysical Time Have a Beginning?. In P. Copan & W. L. Craig (Eds.), The kalām cosmological argument: Philosophical arguments for the finitude of the past (Vol. 1). Bloomsbury Academic.
↩︎ - Einstein, A. (1955). Letter to Michele Besso, March 21, 1955. In H. Dukas & B. Hoffmann (Eds.), Albert Einstein: The human side (pp. 110–111). Princeton University Press. ↩︎
- “god & cosmology” – 2014 Greer-Heard Forum. Sean Carroll. (n.d.). https://www.preposterousuniverse.com/blog/2014/02/24/post-debate-reflections/
↩︎ - Hawking, S. (1988). A brief history of time: From the Big Bang to black holes. Bantam Books.
↩︎ - Guth, A. H. (2007). Eternal inflation and its implications. Journal of Physics A: Mathematical and Theoretical, 40(25), 6811–6826. https://doi.org/10.1088/1751-8113/40/25/S25
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Further Resources
Books
- Carroll, S. M. (2016). The big picture: On the origins of life, meaning, and the universe itself. Dutton.
- Copan, P., & Craig, W. L. (Eds.). (2017). The Kalam cosmological argument, Volume 1: Philosophical arguments for the finitude of the past (Kindle ed.). Bloomsbury Academic.
- Greene, B. (2011). The hidden reality: Parallel universes and the deep laws of the cosmos. Alfred A. Knopf.
- Hawking, S. (1988). A brief history of time: From the Big Bang to black holes. Bantam Books.
- Hume, D. (2000). A treatise of human nature (D. F. Norton & M. J. Norton, Eds.). Oxford University Press. (Original work published 1739)
- Smith, Q., & Craig, W. L. (1993). Theism, atheism, and big bang cosmology. Clarendon Press.